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Public Private Partnership. Is a venture funded and operated though a 
partnership of government and private industry. 
Billet 
A pallet like platform used to lift breakbulk cargo in and out of a ship's hold. 
Breakbulk Cargo 
General cargo that is handled piece by piece in a ships hold, not containerized or 
intermodal. 
FEU 
A 40-foot ISO container, measuring (nominally 40 feet by 8 feet by 8 liz feet. 
(Forty-Foot Equivalent Unit) 
Gondola Car 
A rail car specially designed to haul double-stacked shipping containers, with 
the bottom of the body of the rail car below the top of car wheels, to reduce the 
overall height of the container cargo. Also called a well car. 
Just In Time 
A strategy for inventory management in which raw materials and components 
are delivered from the vendor or supplier immediately before they are needed 
in the manufacturing process. 
Kraft Pulp 
Kraft pulp is what you get after you place a chip of wood in a pressurized vessel 
in the presence of hot caustic soda and sodium sulfide. The cooking process 
attacks and eventually dissolves the phenolic material called lignin that glues 
the fibers to each other in the wood. The word "kraft" means "strong" in the 
German language of its origin 
NBSK 
Northern Bleached Softwood Kraft pulp. Standard of pulp that is made from 
coniferous trees growing north of the 45th parallel in North America, Europe 
and Asia. 
Pallet 
A flat transport structure designed to hold freight items, to allow for easy 
handling by forklifts and reduce damage to the item. 
iv 
Post Panamax Vessel 
A ship that is too large to fit through the Panama Canal 
Shipping Company 
A steam ship or container ship line that hauls cargo by ocean. 
TEU 
A 20 foot ISO container, measuring (nominally) 20 feet by 8 feet by 8 Vz feet. 
(Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit) 
Unitized Pulp 
A package of 8 bales of pulp, weighing approximately 1800 kg, held together 
with wire, used to handle breakbulk pulp 
Well Car 
A rail car specially designed to haul double stacked shipping containers, with 
the bottom of the body of the rail car below the top of car wheels, to reduce the 
overall height of the container cargo. Also called a Gondola car. 
Van 
A 53' dry trailer, pulled by truck for hauling cargo. 
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This document examines the state of containerization in Northern 
British Columbia, specifically at Mackenzie Pulp Mill Corporation, describing 
the current situation and examining the opportunities that containerization 
could bring the mill and industry in the Central Interior. 
Containerization has revolutionized cargo transportation and has 
reduced the cost, time, and damage of every product shipped by container. 
In September 2007, Prince Rupert opened a state of the art, 500,000 
TEU container port facility. A 3P partnership that incorporates the latest 
technology and container management systems, along with the largest cranes 
on the West Coast, able to service the newest super post-Panamax vessels up 
to 12,500 TEU. CN rail upgraded its rail lines from the port to Chicago and 
Memphis, to allow seamless double tracked container transport on the least 
congested rail line in North America. CN also built two inland container 
terminals, one in Prince George and the second in Edmonton. 
Despite the proximity to this transportation infrastructure, and 30% to 
40% of the containers returning to Prince Rupert empty, industrial users such 
as Mackenzie Pulp still rail their pulp in conventional boxcars to Vancouver for 
stuffing into containers for shipping to Asia. 
The reasons for the lack of container use are complex, but the outcome 
is maintaining the status quo is the least expensive method of delivering 
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product to their customers and it will take further developments before 
industry will be able to load containers in the North. 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Containerization has transformed the way products are moved around 
the globe, and has been called the 3 rd industrial revolution (Stulman 1974), 
owing to the way that it has transformed society. Despite the impact that 
containers have had, there has been very little serious study of the container 
and its consequences, except in the area of labour relations (Levinson 2008). 
The purpose of this document is to examine the current use of containers in 
Northern British Columbia using Mackenzie Pulp Mill Corporation's 
experience, and then to investigate alternatives to circumvent the current 
impasse of no containers being filled by industry in the Northern Interior of 
British Columbia and take advantage of containerization for transportation of 
pulp to Asia. 
The document surveys the history of containerization, detailing the 
physical and financial reasons for the success of containerization throughout 
the world and extrapolates the benefits of containerization to the pulp mill's 
current shipping practices. The document describes the current situation 
regarding the shipment of pulp and assesses the opportunities that 
containerized shipping from the mill site might provide. 
The document then offers suggestions on how current practices could 
be changed to allow industry in Northern British Columbia and Mackenzie 
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Pulp Mill specifically to take advantage of the benefits of shipping in 
containers. 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will survey the literature describing how 
containerization works, starting with an examination of the history of 
breakbulk cargo, containers and ports. It will then look at the economics of 
containerization and the railroads role in moving containers. 
3.1 Breakbulk Cargo 
The history of containerization first starts with the history of shipping. 
Before containerization, shipping a product had not changed since the time of 
the Phoenicians (Donovan 2004). Manufacturing was typically an urban 
enterprise, with factories clustered near the docks for ease of delivery of raw 
materials and faster shipment of finished goods (Levinson 2008). The shipper 
would load his goods piece by piece, all tagged for its destination, into a truck, 
rail car or cart for delivery to a warehouse called a transit shed along side the 
dock. Each piece was unloaded, tallied and stored in the transit shed. When 
the ship was ready to load, each item was removed from the transit shed, 
tallied, and placed beside the ship. Longshoremen would gather the cargo into 
a draft, which is basically a pallet, often sitting on a net. Cables would be 
positioned underneath the pallet and it would be hoisted into the ships hold. 
Here the skilled longshoremen would pack the cargo into the hold of the ship, 
assembling the cargo so that they maximized the space inside the ship and 
ensured that everything was packed tightly, so that nothing could shift or 
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break during the voyage, endangering the ship or the other cargo (Talley 
2000). 
At the destination port, the procedure was reversed, with the 
longshoremen picking through the jigsaw puzzle of the tightly packed cargo, 
carrying each piece to a draft to be hoisted out of the hold. The cargo was then 
spread out on the dock, to be inspected by customs, and then the buyer's 
representatives. After duties were assessed and the goods were pronounced 
to be undamaged, the tags were read, tallied and the products were sorted to 
the transit shed. Here pieces were loaded on to a truck or train for delivery to 
their next destination. 
The process was slow and expensive. The ship could not start to be 
loaded until all the cargo was unloaded. The average time that a cargo ship 
spent in port was three weeks, which made for a very nice life for merchant 
seamen and itinerant travellers, who could enjoy the time in a port 
(Updegrove 2006). However for the owner of the ship this was very 
expensive, with 60 to 75% of the cost of transporting cargo by ship being 
spent on the dock. (Levinson 2008). 
The high cost of shipping was a disincentive to ship products overseas, 
so the world was full of small manufacturers shipping locally. 
The cost of freight to sell internationally could be 25% of the cost of the 
item. In the United States, international trade was a smaller percentage of the 
economy in 1960 than it was in 1950 or even in the depression year of 1930, 
because ofthe increasing cost of international freight. (Levinson 2008) 
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3.2 Containers 
Breakbulk cargo was subject to theft from the dockworkers. In New 
York, it was estimated that 3 0% of the whisky and coffee travelling through 
the port disappeared through shrinkage (Donovan 2004). In an effort to 
control theft, reduce handling, and improve efficiencies, various shippers tried 
shipping their products in boxes. The French and English railways tried 
wooden containers to move household furniture in the late nineteenth 
century, using cranes to move the boxes from flatcars to horse carts. In 1929, 
an American steamship operator, Seatrain Lines, operated specially built ships 
holding railway boxcars in metal cells, lifting the cars on and off the ship with 
dockside cranes. In 1949, Brown Industries of Spokane, Washington built 30-
foot aluminum boxes that could be stacked two high on barges operating 
between Seattle and Alaska, or placed on a chassis and pulled by a truck. 
(Levinson 2008). None of these containers were very successful, however, and 
the shippers of the world struggled with expensive, slow deliveries and 
shrinkage of high value products. 
This started to change in 1955, when the owner of a trucking company, 
Malcom McLean, realized that most shippers of cargo didn't care how a 
product got to its destination; they just wanted it to get there (Postrel 2006). 
The ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) controlled the shipping and 
pricing of all shipping routes in the US and wouldn't let a trucking company 
own a shipping company. McLean sold his trucking company and purchased a 
US shipping company, Pan-Atlantic Steamship corporation, which in 1955, 
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operated 4 ships and had operating rights to 16 US east coast ports. Four 
months later, he purchased Pan-Atlantic's parent company, Waterman 
Steamship Corporation. 
McLean's plan was to build 7 new, roll-on/roll-off ships that could carry 
288 truck trailers each, but through his planning McLean realized that this 
would be inefficient; the wheels beneath each trailer would waste a lot of 
space. Without wheels he could gain a third more usable cargo space. 
Without the wheels, however, there was no way to load and unload these 
trailers, the trailers were not strong enough to be lifted and could not support 
other trailers for stacking. McLean abandoned the building of the roll-on/roll-
off ships and then decided instead to purchase some ex WW2 oil tankers and 
convert the decks to hold containers. After experimenting with strengthening 
road trailers, McLean instead decided to purchase two hundred, 33-foot 
containers from Brown Industries who were building and using 30-foot 
containers on their Seattle to Alaska route. McLean then hired Brown's chief 
engineer Keith Tantlinger to figure out how to make the containers stackable 
and secure. Tantlinger was successful in devising a corner clamp that would 
support the container when being lifted and allow the container to be locked 
to the containers below and above to secure the container during heavy seas. 
With his engineering problems solved, McLean had to wait for both the ICC 
and the Coast Guard to approve his plan. On April 26, 1956 he loaded 58 
containers on his ship, the Ideal-X, in under 8 hours and transported them 
from Newark New Jersey to Houston Texas for a loading cost of $0.158 per ton, 
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compared to a breakbulk rate of $5.83 per tonne (Levinson 2008). Malcolm 
faced huge opposition from trucking companies, railroads and longshoremen, 
all of who, at some point, refused to handle his containers and tried to disrupt 
his shipping business, in order to protect their jobs and businesses. While 
they caused him considerable grief along the way, they were ultimately 
unsuccessful in stopping his container business. 
On the Pacific Coast, Matson Navigation Company started shipping 
24-foot, 8 Yz foot wide containers from San Francisco to Hawaii on August 31, 
1958 on a ship with 20 containers on its deck. In May 1960, Matson began 
sailing ships that held 408- 25 ton containers, including 72 refrigerated units, 
all loaded and unloaded by purpose-built dock cranes capable of moving 400 
tons per hour, more than 40 times the 10 tons per hour a longshoremen gang 
could move (Levinson 2008). Matson's cranes unloaded and loaded ships at 
the same time, by emptying one stack of containers then refilling the empty 
space, utilizing the crane in both directions. 
The next step in containerization was standardization in container size, 
attachments and capacity. The United States Maritime Administration started 
working on this in 1958, followed by the American Standards Association and 
they decided by the summer of 1959 that the standard container would be 20 
or 40 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8 feet high. There was no company in the 
United States using containers of that size, and it was a difficult process to get 
industry to agree to those sizes. In 1961 the Maritime Administration 
announced that 10', 20', 30' and 40' containers with 8'x8' width and height 
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were standard size containers. The International Standards Organization 
(ISO) then became involved and started working on getting an international 
standard for shipping containers. It took until 1970 for ISO to publish the 
worldwide standards sizes for containers. 
ISO STANDARD CONTAINER SPECIFICATIONS 
ISO Container Capacity 
Length Cubic Capacity Tare Weight Max Gross 
Weight 
20 feet 1165 cubic feet 5050 lbs. 67,200 lbs. 
40 feet 2350 cubic feet 8000 lbs. 71,650 lbs. 
40ft HC 2 694 cubic feet 8775lbs. 71,650 lbs. 
Figure 1 
ISO Container Dimension - Exterior 
Length Exterior Length Exterior Width Exterior Height 
20 feet 19' 10" 8' 8'6" 
40 feet 40' 8' 8'6" 
40ft. HC 40' 8' 9'6" 
Figure 2 
ISO Container Dimensions - Interior 
Length Interior Length Interior Width Interior Height 
20 feet 19' 3" 7' 8" 7' 9.875" 
40 feet 39' 5" 7' 8" 7' 9.875" 
40ft HC 39' 5" 7' 8" 8'10" 
Figure 3 
ISO Container Dimensions - Door Opening 
Length Width Height 
20 feet 7' 8" 7' 5" 
40 feet 7' 8" 7' 5" 
40ft HC 7' 8" 7' 5" 
Figure 4 
(W&K Container n.d.) 
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3.3 Economics of Containers 
As Malcom McLean had envisioned, shippers only cared about the 
delivered cost of their products. They didn't care about loading efficiencies. 
However in the 1950's in the United States, the ICC (Interstate Commerce 
Commission) regulated the rates and routes of trains and trucks with a 
mandate to preserve essential transportation services, prevent destructive 
competition and to promote efficiency and modernization (Donovan 2004). 
The ICC introduced the Transportation Act of 1958, being directed by 
Congress not to keep any carrier's rates high just to protect another mode of 
transportation, but also to block unfair or destructive competition. The act 
allowed the railroads to competitively haul"piggyback" truck trailer loads, 
which was a semi trailer on a flat deck rail car. This was typically competitive 
on distances greater than 500 miles, which was the most a driver could travel 
in one day. Manufacturers were quick to learn that they could save money by 
filling trailers and shipping them by rail, which would prepare them for 
eventual container loading. Piggyback transportation generated new profits 
for the railroads and resulted in the railroads actively discouraging container 
movement by train, rationalizing that containers would reduce boxcar or 
piggyback traffic. European railroads, however, embraced the fledgling 
container market, offering flat rate transportation of containers as soon as 
they arrived in Europe (Levinson 2008). In the United States, this lack of rail 
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interest continued until the June 1970 bankruptcy of Penn Central, the largest 
railroad in the US, followed by 6 more rail bankruptcies. This required 
government intervention and highlighted the regulations that the ICC had in 
place that prevented the railroads and the trucking companies from being 
exposed to free market competition. In 1980 Congress removed the rules on 
interstate trucking, removed ICC from approving rail rates, and removed the 
rule that all rail customers should pay the same rates. By 1988 US shippers 
were paying almost 20% less for domestic freight. Where it had cost 4 cents to 
move 1 ton of containerized freight in 1982, rates dropped by 40% (before 
inflation) by 1988. The next step was the US Shipping Act of 1984 for 
maritime shippers, which allowed shippers and carriers to negotiate rates. 
The US Military's rate for containerized cargo in October 1979 went from 
$40.94 per 40 cubic feet either way across the Pacific to $2.30 Westbound and 
$15.89 Eastbound by 1986. This price reduction was on top of an inflation rate 
of about 30% during the same time period (Levinson 2008), which was an 
inflation adjusted decrease of $44.13 or 83%. 
Today there are more than 77 container shipping companies, with a 
capacity of 13,108,589 TEU carried on 6,048 ships in the worldwide container 
business. The largest company APM Maersk has a capacity of 2,031886 TEU, 
with 539 ships, and 15.5% of the market (Konrad 2009). 
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3.4 The Ports 
As containerization reduced the cost of transportation to 1 to 2% of the 
cost of the goods (Donovan 2004), most of the initial savings came from the 
ports. Since 1960 the number of longshoremen employed declined by 95% 
(Donovan 2004) as containers and cranes removed the need for the 
longshoremen to directly handle the cargo. Containers were stuffed and 
emptied away from the port, again removing the need for longshoremen. One 
benefit of these changes was that longshoremen were now working scheduled 
hours and no longer needed to be at the pier in the morning to hope for work, 
so they moved to the suburbs, away from the waterfront (Levinson 2008). 
With the workers moving away and manufacturing no longer required to be 
near the shipping point, the neighbourhoods surrounding the harbor became 
ghettos, resulting in unemployment and poverty rates significantly higher in 
port districts than the metropolitan areas that surround them. (Grobar 2008). 
Since port districts pay the social and political price for increased trade, 
without reaping any of the benefits , those living in the port districts have 
typically opposed any expansion of the port, and this has limited growth in 
trade (Grobar 2008). For governments in North America this is a continual 
political issue to be resolved. 
As the rapid growth of containerization has devastated port workers, it 
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has also devastated some of the ports as well. When containerization arrived, 
if the port wasn't ready to handle containers, the shipping companies moved 
to ports that were. San Francisco's traffic moved to Oakland. London and 
Liverpool were England's biggest ports in the early 1960's, with half of the 
country's trade. The ports and the unions weren't ready to accept 
containerization, so the shipping companies moved to Felixstowe, a private 
port owned by the Felizstowe Railway and Dock Company, 90 miles north of 
London. By 1968 Felixstowe was England's largest container port, and 
London lost to Rotterdam its distinction as Europe's maritime center 
(Levinson 2008). 
At this time, container ships are growing larger with each generation as 
operators exploit economies of scale (Cullinane and Khanna 1999). The 
container companies are embracing pendulum routes with a hub and spoke 
operation at each end (Medda and Carbonaro 2007). This model, similar to 
that of airlines, maximizes the ocean-going time of the largest containerships 
and minimizes port time. The issue for ports is that they need to have the 
depth, speed, handling costs, reliability and hinterland connections 
(Wiegmans, VanDer Hoest and Notteboom 2008) to handle these increasingly 
larger ships economically. The issue for policy makers is funding these 
capitally expensive ventures without any guarantee that the shipping lines will 
come. The ports have become pawns in the global transportation industry 
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(Talley 2000), with shipping companies moving on a whim to the next location 
that has less overall cost. To accommodate increasingly larger ships or just to 
keep up with the competition, ports must constantly invest large sums of 
capital, with no guarantee that the shippers won't move to the next port that 
offers them a better deal. One solution that is growing in popularity is leasing 
the ports to private operators. The operators who lease the terminals and pay 
for port equipment often have better access to capital and can spread the cost 
over many operations. They also don't overinvest in the hopes of spurring 
local development (Postrel 2006). Prince Rupert's Fairview Terminal is an 
example of a private operator investing capital to operate a container port 
(Western Economic Diversification 2007). 
3.5 Railroads and Power 
Railroads in North America have had a long history of resisting change 
in order to preserve the status quo. In 1966 Malcolm McLean wanted his sales 
people to find manufacturers in the Midwest who were exporting to Europe 
and have them consolidate their products in containers that McLean would 
truck in to freight yards in Chicago and St Louis. There, they would be double 
stacked on rail cars that McLean would purchase for special trains that would 
transport the containers to McLean's dock in New Jersey. Shipper's costs for 
the domestic portion of the trip to Europe would fall by half, and customers 
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would know when their product would arrive. The railroads responded with 
the minimum offer that the ICC would allow: they would take the containers 
but they would be mixed in with other cars on their regular slow freight trains. 
In 1967 Whirlpool Corporation asked New York Central Railroad to 
move containers of refrigerators to New Jersey. The railroad responded by 
telling Whirlpool to ship them in boxcars and stuff them into containers at the 
port. Whirlpool containerized them and shipped them by truck (all from 
Levinson, 2008). 
While most railroads now haul containers, the railroads are still 
unfriendly to container companies. In her 2003 study, Lopez reported that 
unlike trucking companies, railroads won't haul empty containers on a spot 
basis; the empty containers need to be part of a minimum one year contract. 
This contract is for a specific capacity, based on the previous years 
movements. If a shipper has a record of increasing volume every year, then 
the railroad will increase the capacity in the new contract. The shipper pays 
for capacity even if they don't use it. If a shipper uses more capacity than 
booked, they pay a premium for the extra capacity. Because the railroad has a 
monopoly, they don't need to negotiate, but will dictate to the shipper what 
the terms will be (Lopez 2003). 
As container traffic grows, railroads will become increasingly 
14 
dependent on container traffic for their profits. This dependancy should allow 
the container companies to exert more influence over the railroads concerning 
freight rates and transit times. 
4.0 BACKGROUND 
Before containerization, a manufacturer would produce its product, tag 
it for the destination and then would pay to have it shipped by truck, rail or 
cart to a warehouse at the port. After unloading at the warehouse, the 
quantity and destination would be recorded and it would be stored in the 
warehouse. When the ship was ready to load, the products would be moved to 
the dock, tallied again, and placed on billets (basically a pallet, often sitting on 
a net) and hoisted into the ship. The billets would then be unloaded into the 
hold. While forklifts would be used on larger items on bigger ships, raw 
muscle by the longshoremen was used extensively. The hold needed to be 
packed tightly, both to maximize space, but primarily to ensure that no cargo 
would shift while at sea, which could damage other cargo or even jeopardize 
the ship. On arrival at the destination port, the procedure would be reversed, 
with billets lowered into the hold of the ship, and the goods loaded onto them 
and then winched out to be placed on the pier. Inspections would take place, 
both for customs and by the owner's representatives to check for damage. The 
product would then be put into the warehouse. This labour intensive process 
of loading and unloading the ships could take days or weeks, depending on the 
size of the ship and the productivity of the longshoremen. 
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Depending on the volume, the product could be shipped directly to the 
customer, or the product would be consolidated for shipment by truck or train 
to a regional warehouse, where it would be unloaded and then reloaded onto a 
truck for final delivery to the customer. 
This was an expensive process, with each handling of the product 
taking time and creating an opportunity for theft and damage, which for high 
value products (like alcohol) could be 30% of the product.l As well, each time 
the product was put into a warehouse, it could spend days to weeks sitting, 
waiting for the next leg of the journey. The producer of the product would 
need to arrange for the shipment to the port, the shipment across the ocean, 
the customs at the port, delivery to the regional warehouse and the final 
delivery to the purchaser, which could involve five different weigh bills. The 
producer would be responsible for payments for shipping to five different 
companies, plus custom brokerage and duty, often all in advance. 
4.1 Shipment of Pulp 
Because of the volume of pulp shipped, manufacturers have devised 
ways to make the transportation of pulp more efficient than traditional 
breakbulk. When pulp is produced it comes out of a dryer in a wide 
continuous layer. The layer is slit into sections and the sections are cut into 
sheets. The sheets are then stacked into bales. Each bale of pulp weighs about 
200 kg. 
1 (Donovan 2004) 
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Pulp on the bale scale at Mackenzie Pulp. The weight is in kilos, the bale of 
pulp has not been be compressed at this point. 
Figure 5 
Photo by Mark Robillard 
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The bales are compressed to reduce volume for shipping and then wrapped 
with a sheet of pulp. Zinc-covered carbon steel wire is used to hold the bale 
together. 
Figure 6 
Photo by Mark Robillard 
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The bales are then stacked 4 high and two stacks are wired together in a unit. 
This unitized pulp is transported to a port for breakbulk or container loading. 
Figure 14 
Photo by Mark Robillard 
19 
At the port, special lifting mechanisms are used to lift multiple units of 
pulp into the hold of a breakbulk ship. This process has increased the 
efficiency of loading breakbulk pulp. 
Figure 8 
Photo by Dick Lund. 
http://dlund.20m.com/ZMarMen01.html 
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The breakbulk pulp is loaded tightly into the hold of a ship for transportation. 
As with all breakbulk it is important to ensure that the cargo does not shift or 
move during the sea voyage. 
Figure 9 
Photo from UK P&I Club 
http://www. ukpandi.com /loss-prevention I cargo-stowage-advice I cargo-
photo-library/general-cargo /wood -pulp-bales I 
Unitized breakbulk pulp is typically sent to Europe. Most Asian paper 
mills receive their pulp in containers. The typical mill in the Central Interior 
unitizes their pulp and sends it to Vancouver in a boxcar where it is either 
stuffed into a container or loaded breakbulk. 
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5.0 PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE 
Mackenzie Pulp is a small kraft pulp mill, producing about 240,000 
tonnes of pulp per year. The Mackenzie mill historically shipped most of its 
pulp production by rail to the North American paper and tissue market. As 
Latin American and Asian paper makers built newer, faster and bigger paper 
and tissue machines over the past two decades, they have put pressure on 
North American paper and tissue makers to become more efficient. The North 
American industry was not entirely successful in its ability to respond to the 
pressure, and paper and tissue mills began to close in response to these less 
expensive imports. 
As a result, Mackenzie Pulp had to find other customers for its pulp, and 
gradually shipped more product to Asia and Europe. At the time of the mill 
closing in 2008, the mill shipped 40% of its product to Asia, 40% to North 
America and the remaining 20% to Europe. 
In 2010 Paper Excellence BV, a wholly owned subsidiary of APP, Asia 
Pulp and Paper, purchased Mackenzie Pulp out of bankruptcy. Privately held 
APP is the third largest pulp and paper company in the word, with a stated 
goal of becoming the world's largest pulp and paper company. APP is part of a 
larger family-held company called Sinarmas, based in Indonesia, with interests 
in industrial agriculture, banking, insurance, education, mining and 
manufacturing. 
Mackenzie pulp was purchased specifically to provide its very high 
quality NBSK (northern bleached softwood kraft) as raw material to APP's 
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paper and tissue machines in Asia. All of Mackenzie Pulp's production is sent 
to Asia. 
The pulp is loaded into CN boxcars and railed to Vancouver, where it is 
unloaded, put into a warehouse, and then reloaded into containers for 
shipment to Asia. The efficiency of this process could be improved by looking 
at the feasibility of loading pulp into containers in Mackenzie for shipment to 
Asia. 
Current process of shipping pulp at Mackenzie Pulp 
Figure 10 
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Proposed process for shipping pulp from Mackenzie Pulp 
Figure 11 
Boxcars are rectangular shaped rail cars, with double doors on each 
side, which hold about 88 tonnes of pulp. Pulp mills prefer vented rail cars, 
which are cars with air vents located on the topsides of the cars that increase 
the airflow through the car. Without side vents, condensation from moisture 
evaporating off warm pulp collects on the roof of the railcar and drips back 
onto the pulp in cold weather. The pulp absorbs this water and expands. This 
expansion destroys the integrity of the bale of pulp and increases the difficulty 
for the customer to unload the pulp. CN currently provides about 40% of the 




http: //www.flickr.com/photos /86812298@NOO /4933177 63 
by Kumar McMillan 
Containers come in a variety of standard sizes and include vented boxes 
for pulp. The two most common sizes in North America are: 
Standard 20 foot ISO Container 
Inside Inside Inside Door 
length width height width 
19'4" 7' 8" 7' 10" 7' 8" 
5.9 M 2.35M 2.393M 2.342M 
Figure 13 














7' 10" 7' 8" 
2.393M 2.342M 
Door Capacity Tare 
height weight 
7' 6" 1172 ft3 5071lb. 
2.28M 33.2M3 2300 kg 
Door Capacity Tare 
height weight 
7' 6" 2390 ft3 8,267lb. 










20-foot sea container- 1 TEU 
Figure 15 
Photo from Outspan.us 
http://www.mcssl.com/store/1895384/catalog/product/7d1ced56c9ee4a27 
9ecaf423d7309108 
The 40-foot containers are gaining in popularity with shippers, as they 
require half of the ship loading time of a 20-foot container. However with 
heavy commodities such as pulp, 20-foot containers are used, as the maximum 
payload of a 20-foot container is 28,180 kg and the maximum payload of a 40-
foot container is 28,750 kg and a 20-foot container reaches its maximum 
weight before it fills its volume.3 
CN has a monopoly on all rail movement in the Northern Interior of 
British Columbia; moving pulp by boxcars or in containers by rail has to be 
done by CN. CN does not own any containers and currently its fleet of double 
gondola cars is only allocated for East-West Traffic, specifically between 
3 (Ahn n.d.) 
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Prince Rupert or Vancouver and Eastern Canada or the Chicago Memphis area 
of the United States. 
Gondola car hauling double stacked 53-foot containers 
Figure 16 
Photo Sean Lamb 
http: II commons.wikimedia.org/wiki /User:Slambo I Gallery 
Containerization has changed the shipping and logistics world, allowing 
worldwide commerce to develop and flourish.4 It has decoupled the need for 
an exporter to be near a port to reduce freight costs.5 
When a container is ordered, the shipping company can give a delivery 
date describing when the container will be delivered. The shipping company 
4 (Gooley 1997) 
s (Postrel 2006) 
27 
looks after all of the freight and logistics. The container's contents, bills of 
lading and customs paperwork are all tracked electronically, allowing shippers 
to know the location of the container at any moment in time. Typically 
customs clearance is done before the ship arrives at port, allowing for more 
rapid movement away from the port.6 
Shipping companies arrange for the shipping of containers with the 
railroads.? Because of shipping companies' railcar volumes, they can purchase 
transport less expensively than an individual shipper such as a pulp mill, or 
even a group of pulp mills. The shipping companies prefer secure long-term 
transport arrangements, to reduce the risk of disruption of container 
movement.8 
In 1956 before containerization, loose cargo cost $5.869 per ton 
to load. Using an ISO container, this cost was reduced to 16¢ per ton for 
loading. The total cost of containerized shipping including ground shipping, 
loading, unloading and the ocean voyage typically costs 1% to 2% of the retail 
cost of the product, 90% less than before containerization using breakbulk.lD 
With containerization, the manufacturers' product arrives at their 
customers in weeks, exactly as it left the factory. 11 Prior to containerization, 
the delivery would take months, and the multiple handling and storage would 
result in shrinkage and damage. 
6 (Levinson 2008) 
7 (Lopez 2003) 
8 (IBED) 
9 (Levinson 2008) 
10 (Donovan 2004) 
11 (Talley 2000) 
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Containerization has changed the way the world does business. 
Containers have allowed Walmart to become the behemoth of retailing, by 
reducing delivery time, cost and shrinkage. The United States Military first 
started using containers during the Vietnam War 12 and containers have been 
an essential component of mobilization and supply since then. On a personal 
level, containers have allowed North American consumers to have 4 times the 
product choice they had in the 70's and, for example, allow you to buy beer or 
wine from anywhere in the world at your local liquor store with the 
transportation portion of the cost only a few cents per bottle.13 
Containerization has taken billions of dollars of inventory out of the 
supply chain and the rapid, traceable and predictable delivery has allowed just 
in time manufacturing to flourish. Toyota's manufacturing plant in Kentucky, 
for example, uses just in time inventory management to build cars in an area 
hundreds of miles from other car manufacturing and suppliers. 
Containerization has changed the economics of ports through three 
different aspects. The container movement business is highly competitive, 
with shipping lines moving quickly to utilize the most efficient and least 
expensive ports and carriers. Thus a city like Everett, Washington, which lost 
its major container carrier, is now an underutilized port, looking for new 
customers.14 
12 (Levinson 2008) 
13 (Donovan 2004) 
14 (Gillie 2010) 
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The second result of containerization is that port cities, which used to 
be hubs of commercial activity, supported by the loading and unloading of 
break bulk cargo, and surrounded by manufacturing and warehouses, are now 
in commercial decline, as containers and their cargo quickly and safely leave 
and arrive at the ports on the way to and from the final destination. Up to 95% 
of the longshoremen jobs have disappeared in ports that have shifted from 
bulk cargo to container, creating economic ghettos in the areas surrounding 
the docks.ts 
The third change is that proximity to a port is less important than at 
any time in history. The need to be located near a port has been eliminated, 
leading to regional socio-economic growth. Shipping costs have declined, so 
other pure economic issues determine the location ofproducers.16 Ports have 
now become just another link in a flexible supply chain17, where every link is 
continually monitored for cost and efficiency and the weak link replaced as 
required. 
The Canadian and British Columbia governments, along with the 
autonomous Prince Rupert Port Authority, privately owned Maher Terminals 
and CN Rail have developed a container port facility in Prince Rupert. Opened 
on Sept 12, 2007 the state of the art terminal boasts some of the largest cranes 
on the West Coast to service the newest super Post-Panamax vessels that can 
carry up to 12,500 TEUs (20 foot equivalent units). The port can currently 
15 (Grobar 2008) 
16 (Slack 1993) 
17 (Donovan 2004) 
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handle 500,000 TEUs per year with plans in place to increase the capacity to 2 
million TEUs per year. CN rail double tracked portions of their rail line and 
increased the length of the sidings from Prince Rupert to Memphis, enlarging 
all their tunnels and bridges to allow double stacked containers, to facilitate 4 
million TEU capacity. CN worked with Maher Terminals on the design of the 
rail terminal to allow the most efficient movement of containers into and away 
from the port.18 
The Prince Rupert port is the deepest natural harbor, with capacity to 
expand, on the west coast. The port is one day closer to Asia than Vancouver 
and Seattle and 3 days closer to Asia than Los Angeles.19 
CN's rail line delivers rail containers to Chicago from Prince Rupert in 
96 hours. The rail line is viewed as the fastest and least congested in North 
America. To support the container traffic, CN has built two inland container 
terminals, in Prince George and in Edmonton. As of March 2010, 30% to 40% 
of the containers returning to Prince Rupert contained cargo; the rest were 
empty.zo 
It is clear that the interior of British Columbia is set up to take 
advantage of containerization, with a new underutilized port, a state of the art 
railroad running past our operations, and empty containers returning to 
Prince Rupert. 
1s (Western Economic Diversification 2007) 
19 (Western Economic Diversification 2007) 
20 (IBED) 
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However, there are no industries in the central interior that are taking 
advantage of containerization to any degree. The author's tour of CN's Prince 
George inland container terminal in August 2010 showed an empty 
warehouse, with no cargo in the warehouse to be loaded into containers. The 
operator of the warehouse said that Can for was loading 6 containers of pulp 
per day and shipping the containers through Prince Rupert. This would 
represent about 120 tonnes of pulp, which is estimated to be less than 5% of 
their daily pulp production. The positive economic benefits of 
containerization are not being realized in the central interior. 
It is less expensive for an interior mill to load its pulp into boxcars, send 
the box cars to Vancouver, have the box car unloaded into a warehouse, have 
the pulp loaded from the warehouse into the containers and then have the 
containers trucked to the dock for loading than it is for the mill to load a 
container and send the container to Prince Rupert. 
There are three primary reasons for this paradox. The first is that 
because of competition from multiple container companies in Vancouver, it is 
less expensive for a shipper to load a container on a ship in Vancouver and 
have it travel to Prince Rupert and then on to Asia then it is to load the same 
container in Prince Rupert. 
The second is because companies that are shipping into Prince Rupert 
have not been interested in releasing containers to pulp mills for shipping pulp 
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through Prince Rupert as this would delay the return of their empties to 
Asia.21 
The third reason is that currently CN does not appear to want to 
disturb the status quo and allow gondola cars to travel on a North-South route. 
They would prefer to continue to move pulp to Vancouver in boxcars for 
container loading, collecting the freight charges from each shipper, rather than 
to haul containerized pulp to Prince Rupert and be paid by the shipping 
companies. It is the author's belief that industrial users pay a higher freight 
rate than container shipping companies. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the current use of containers 
in Northern British Columbia using Mackenzie Pulp Mill Corporation's 
experience, and then to investigate alternatives to circumvent the current 
impasse of no containers being filled by industry in the Northern Interior of 
British Columbia and take advantage of containerization for transportation of 
pulp to Asia. 
The data for this project was acquired from Mackenzie Pulp's internal 
financial data, bids for pulp movement from CN Rail and CN Worldwide, bids 
and quotes for movement of pulp from container steamship lines and from 
other industry sources, both inside and outside of Paper Excellence. 
21 (Ryan 2010) 
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6.0 ANALYSIS 
As a general rule, trucking is less expensive than rail for hauls less than 
500 km.22 As a shipper, it is easy to calculate a trucker's actual costs by 
combining the wages, fuel, depreciation and profit margins, ensuring trucking 
companies' rates are easily auditable. In addition, trucking in North America is 
highly competitive, with low cost of entry and exit, resulting in bids for freight 
movement by truck from multiple companies being very competitive and very 
close in price. Rail, on the other hand, does not disclose its costs and at times 
will offer service below their stated tariff to compete with trucking on shorter 
hauls, if they decide they want the business. 
Mackenzie Pulp Mill spends $34.07 per tonne to rail our pulp to 
Vancouver. In Vancouver it costs $18 per tonne to unload the railcar and stuff 
the container, and another $16 per tonne to truck the container from the 
warehouse to the port, so the total cost from Mackenzie to the port is $68.07 
per tonne of pulp (data from Mackenzie Pulp financial statements). 
If Mackenzie Pulp were able to rail containers to the port in Vancouver, 
the mill should save $34 per tonne, the cost of stuffing the container and 
transporting it to the port. However CN will not release gondola cars for 
North-South traffic. This leaves CN transporting containers to Prince Rupert 
as the only option. 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (Cos co) is the major shipping 
company in Prince Rupert. Cosco's container ships arrive in Prince Rupert, 
22 (Levinson 2008) 
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are partially unloaded and they then travel south to Vancouver and then to 
Portland, before turning north again to load in Prince Rupert. Casco's price for 
shipping pulp to Shanghai from Prince Rupert is $70.73 per tonne and from 
Vancouver it is $70 per tonne (data from Casco bids for moving pulp). This 
results in a saving of 73 cents per tonne or $18.25 per container to ship from 
Vancouver instead of from Prince Rupert. This is in spite of the fact that Cos co 
will haul the containers from Vancouver to Prince Rupert, before it heads East 
to Asia. 
Unfortunately CN can't give a price to an individual for shipping 
containers to Prince Rupert; the railroads deal directly with the shipping 
companies for container shipping. Obtaining a price for shipping from Prince 
George to Prince Rupert requires a quote from a shipping company. At the 
present time, the shipping companies are not interested in giving a quote for 
containers to Mackenzie, so the quote was from Prince George to Shanghai. 
The quote was $114.24 per tonne (from Casco), which combined with the cost 
of freight to Prince George and stuffing the container was $6.70 to $12.17 
more expensive than the current routing, depending on how the pulp was 
shipped from Mackenzie to CN's inland freight terminal in Prince George. 
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Shipping Pulp From Mackenzie to a Container Stuffing Facility 
Prince Prince George Prince Vancouver by 
George by by Container George by CN CN Boxcar 
Van Boxcar 
Mackenzie to: $27.00 $25.25 $21.53 $34.07 
Container $9.00 $9.00 $18.00 
Stuffing 
Container Transport to Port $16.00 
Figure 17 
Container Transport to Port and Ocean Travel 
Vancouver to Shanghai $70.00 
Prince Rupert to Shanghai $70.73 
Prince George to Shanghai $114.24 
Figure 18 
Total Freight Cost for Pulp from Mackenzie To Shanghai Via: 
Prince George by Prince George by Prince George by Vancouver by 
Van, Container Truck Container, CN Boxcar, Boxcar, Container 
Through to Prince Through to Container Trucked to Port 
Rupert By CN Prince Rupert By Through to in Vancouver 
CN Prince Rupert 
$150.24 $139.49 $144.77 $138.07 
Figure 19 
All freight amounts given are from the summer of 2010. Shipping rates 
change on a constant basis depending on volume, competition, the state of the 
economy, the price of oil, and a host of other smaller variables. While the 
freight numbers are out of date, the differences between competing rates will 
remain the same, allowing for a reliable comparison of the options. 
Canfor is currently shipping 6 containers per day out of Prince George 
to Prince Rupert. This is less than 5% of their production, which would lead to 
the inference that they have not found a better freight solution than Mackenzie 
Pulp has and are loading containers as a risk mitigation strategy. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION 
Despite the examples in the literature of companies saving large 
amounts of money and time using containers, this opportunity has not 
presented itself in Northern British Columbia. The primary reasons for this 
are that CN will not allocate any container carriers to any routes other than the 
East- West Prince Rupert to Chicago haul (personal conversation with a CN 
sales representative, April2010),1 and the shipping companies do not want to 
trouble themselves with the issue of delivering empty containers to any site off 
the East-West mainline. "Many Canadian export products require extended 
free detention time at destination - in some cases up to 21 Days. From a 
carrier's perspective, it is better to forgo the export revenue if your equipment 
will be tied up for extended periods in the market where you need the empties 
the most. Better to ship empty and supply the containers to the export 
demand in China".23 
There are a number of opportunities that would allow Mackenzie Pulp 
to access containers and the ability to ship though Prince Rupert. 
The first way to accomplish this would be to leverage APP's global 
volume of shipping. APP is the world's third largest pulp and paper company. 
They are part of the Sinarmas group of companies that include agribusiness, 
mining, insurance, banking and education. APP is investigating consolidating 
its shipping to one company. Currently APP sources bids for each of its 
shipments individually. If APP were to consolidate their shipping to one 
23 (Ryan 2010) 
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provider, the volume should ensure that individual mills like Mackenzie would 
be able to have a shipping company interested in serving them. This would 
obligate the shipping company to provide containers to the mill sites at a 
competitive rate. This is being worked on, but is not progressing with any 
rapidity. 
The second opportunity to access containers and ship from Prince 
Rupert is to wait until more of the North American market realizes that the 
Port of Prince Rupert and CN rail service between Prince Rupert to Chicago is 
fast and uncongested and it will be more economical to ship along this faster 
route. This increased traffic will attract other container ship lines. This 
increased competition for the container traffic should lead to increased 
competition for a pulp and lumber backhaul to Asia and should provide the 
first opportunity to ship commodities from the Central interior to Asia. 
As the North American economy continues to rebound, the demand for 
products manufactured in Asia should increase the flow of containers from 
Asia to North America. Given the congestion in the West Coast ports of the 
United States this should mean that Prince Rupert will see more container 
traffic, which will increase the flow of empty containers past the mills in 
Northern BC, and provide access to containers. 
Another scenario that could develop is that even if the traffic in Prince 
Rupert does not increase, the shipping lines could route more empties to be 
stored in Prince Rupert, to fill up the container ships returning to Asia on their 
last stop, to ensure that no paying cargo is displaced on earlier stops of the 
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ship. With enough of a buffer in Prince Rupert, returning empties could be 
made available to manufacturers in the North, allowing filled containers to 
progress through Prince Rupert. 
The nine pulp mills in Northern British Columbia and the 6 pulp mills in 
Northern Alberta could form a consortium to consolidate their shipping to 
Asia. This could take advantage of the growing hub and spoke practice of the 
shipping companies, and there could be a single location in Asia where all 
North American pulp would ship to and then be distributed from. Given the 
competitive nature of the pulp industry, especially when pulp cycles through a 
low price cycle, continued cooperation would be difficult. 
The growing demand for lumber in China, increasingly being supplied 
by Central Interior sawmills, could develop the container market for shipping 
lumber to China. The lumber by itself, or combined with the pulp shipments 
going to China, could be enough to attract a shipping company to make 
containers available to the interior. 
The increasing population in the lower mainland of Vancouver could 
put increased pressure on CN becoming interested in hauling pulp through 
Prince Rupert rather than Vancouver. This could result from increased line 
congestion through Vancouver increasing the travel time through Vancouver 
and CN and it's customers looking to decrease the transit times. This 
disruption could force CN to make its northern line and the inland container 
terminal in Prince George more competitive as CN gives up on maintaining its 
boxcar traffic. 
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The second opportunity in this scenario would be political pressure 
from the residents of Vancouver to reduce pollution, noise and traffic 
congestion from both the trains and ships in the harbor. This pressure could 
influence the shipping lines and CN to divert more shipping to Prince Rupert. 
This would increase the pulp that move through Prince Rupert. 
The last opportunity would be some other disruptive technology that 
would change the way that containerization works in Northern BC. The 
history of containers has been that no one has been able to predict what the 
next stage of containerization will be, or the direction that the market will 
take. It would not be unreasonable for some new development to change the 
way the business operates and make containers available for the Northern 
Interior. 
8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is inevitable that industry will have complete access to containers in 
the north. Throughout the history of containers there have been many 
attempts by self-serving groups to limit the access or growth in the movement 
of containers, but inexorably the most efficient way of doing business will win. 
However Mackenzie Pulp should continue to pressure their parent 
company APP to develop a worldwide supply agreement with a single 
container company. This will give us first mover advantage in pulp shipments 
through Prince Rupert. When we start to move pulp through Prince Rupert, 
we should save, at a minimum, the difference of the costs of container stuffing 
and transportation to port in Vancouver, which is $25 per tonne or $5.87 
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million per year. In addition, there should be freight savings available from 
the container shipping companies' ability to purchase freight from CN better 
than the pulp mill can. 
In the longer term as the traffic and competition increases in Prince 
Rupert, the rates from Prince Rupert to Asia should decrease to reflect the 
shorter sailing distance and time. Availability of containers should result in 
higher traffic, increasing the opportunity for industry in the Central Interior to 
affordably assess containers for their shipments to Asia. 
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